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Introduction 
At various times in our lives and to varying levels of intensity, we all use, 
provide or pay for health and social care. As we decide what to do, take, offer or 
buy, we need evidence that is reliable, robust and trustworthy about different 
options. Even before James Lind’s experiment comparing possible treatments 
for scurvy on HMS Salisbury people had recognised that getting this evidence 
requires strenuous efforts to reduce bias – but that achieving this is often not 
straightforward. This book of essays from the James Lind Library is our attempt 
to illustrate some of the challenges encountered and how to overcome them. 
We will take you on a journey through the sometimes stormy waters of why 
treatments need to be tested, rather than being based on assumptions that “it 
must work” before the treatment has even been tried, or based  on impressions 
after it has been used a few times, through to the need for fair tests comparing 
alternative treatment options. We will show why genuine uncertainties must be 
identified and addressed, and how research to find the most effective and 
appropriate treatments need to build on research to identify the most effective 
and appropriate methods for doing that research. We will navigate through the 
reasons why comparisons need to be fair at the outset, and then kept fair as the 
treatments being tested are given; outcomes are measured; and results are 
analysed, reported, and combined in systematic reviews of all the relevant, 
trustworthy evidence.  
We have not cluttered the chapters with references to all the source material on 
which we have drawn. For that level of detail, please follow the links to the 
fuller essays on the James Lind Library website (www.jameslindlibrary.org). 
Instead, where we know of reviews of methodology research which are relevant 
to a topic, we have listed these at the end of each chapter. 
By the end of the book, we hope that you will recognise how, to bring benefits 
of research to patients and the public, systematic reviews of fair tests are needed 
to provide key elements of the knowledge needed to inform decisions about 
health and social care, while taking into account other important factors, such as 
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values, preferences, needs, resources and priorities. We also hope that, as you 
finish the book, you will share the sense of enlightenment, education and 
enjoyment that we have gained from preparing it. 
Finally, we dedicate this book to England’s National Institute for Health 
Research. Without the Institute’s16-year-long support for the James Lind 
Initiative, the home of the James Lind Library during that time, neither the 
Library nor these essays would have been possible. And we also wish to 
acknowledge the role the Institute plays in recognising the vital contribution of 
research to the delivery of health and social care that is effective and efficient, 
and the Institute’s leadership in ensuring that the research itself is effective, 
efficient and reliable, with minimal waste. 
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“Without experiment nothing can be sufficiently known” 
Bacon, Roger (1266)  
Opus maius. MS Digby 325, 15th century manuscript. Bodleian Library, Oxford 
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Section 1: Introduction to JLL Explanatory Essays   
 
Despite acting with the best of intentions, health professionals have sometimes 
done more harm than good to the patients who have put their trust in them and 
looked to them for help. Some of this suffering can be reduced by ensuring that 
fair tests are done to address uncertainties about the effects of treatments. 
 
Over the past half century, health care has had a substantial impact on people’s 
chances of living longer and being free of serious health problems. It has been 
estimated that health care has been responsible for between a third and a half of 
the increase in life expectancy and for an average of five additional years free of 
chronic health problems. Even so, the public could have obtained – and still 
could obtain – far better value for the very substantial resources it invested in 
research intended to improve health. Furthermore, some of the treatment 
disasters of the past could have been avoided, and others could be prevented in 
future. 
Misleading claims about the effects of treatments are common, so all of us 
should understand how to recognise a valid claim about the effects of treatments 
and how these are made. Without this knowledge, we risk concluding that 
useless treatments are helpful, or that helpful treatments are useless. The James 
Lind Library has been created to improve general understanding of fair tests of 
treatments in health care, and how they have evolved over time. 
These Explanatory Essays provide a brief introduction and overview of the 
scope of the Library. You can explore in more detail by following the links to 
in-depth Articles and primary Records in the Library itself.  
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In more depth 
The James Lind Library 1.0 Introduction to JLL Explanatory Essays 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/1-0-introduction-to-jll-explanatory-
essays/) 
  
 The James Lind Library’s Introduction to Fair Tests of Treatments 
 
 8 
 
1.1 Why treatment uncertainties should be 
addressed   
 
Ignoring uncertainties about the effects of treatments has led to avoidable 
suffering and deaths. To reduce this suffering and premature mortality, 
treatment uncertainties must be acknowledged and addressed, first by reviewing 
systematically what is already known, and then by doing well-designed research 
to reduce continuing uncertainties. 
 
Trying to do more good than harm 
Why do we need fair tests of treatments in health care? Have not doctors, for 
centuries, ‘done their best’ for their patients? Sadly, there are many examples of 
doctors and other health professionals harming their patients because decisions 
were not informed by what we consider now to be reliable evidence about the 
effects of treatments.  
With hindsight, health professionals in most if not all spheres of health care 
have harmed their patients inadvertently, sometimes on a very wide scale. 
Indeed, patients themselves have sometimes harmed other patients when, on the 
basis of untested theories and limited personal experiences, they have 
encouraged the use of treatments that have turned out to be harmful. The 
question is not whether we must blame these people, but whether the harmful 
effects of inadequately tested treatments can be reduced. They can - to a great 
extent. 
A first step is acknowledging that treatments can sometimes do more harm than 
good.  We need to be more willing to admit uncertainties about treatment 
effects, and to promote tests of treatments to adequately reduce uncertainties. 
We refer to such tests as ‘fair tests’. 
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In the 17th century, the Flemish physician Jean-Baptiste van Helmont proposed casting lots to 
decide which patients should be treated by orthodox physicians with bloodletting and 
purging, and which by him without these treatments. 
Van Helmont JB (1648)   
Ortus medicinæ: Id est Initia physicæ inaudita. Progressus medicinae novus, in morborum 
ultionem, ad vitam longam [The dawn of medicine: That is, the beginning of a new Physic. A 
new advance in medicine, a victory over disease, to (promote) a long life]. Amsterodami: 
Apud Ludovicum Elzevirium, pp 526-527. 
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Why theories about the effects of treatments must be 
tested in practice 
People have often been harmed because treatments have been based only on 
theories about how health problems should be treated, without testing how the 
theories play out in practice.  
For example, for centuries people believed the theory that illnesses were caused 
by ‘humoral imbalances’. As a result, patients were bled and purged, made to 
vomit and take snuff, all in the belief that this would end the supposed 
imbalances. Still, a 17th century Flemish doctor, Johannes van Helmont, was 
impertinent enough to challenge the medical authorities of the time to assess the 
validity of their theories by proposing a fair test of the results of their unpleasant 
treatments. 
By the end of the 18th century, British army and naval surgeons had begun to 
show the harmful effects of bloodletting for treating “fevers”. A few decades 
later, the practice was also challenged by a Parisian physician. Yet at the 
beginning of the 20th century, mainstream doctors in Boston, USA, who were 
not using bloodletting to treat pneumonia were still being judged negligent. 
Indeed, Sir William Osler, one of the most influential medical authorities in the 
world, who was generally cautious about recommending unproven treatments, 
advised his readers at the end of the 19th century that: “during the last decades 
we have certainly bled too little.” 
Although the need to test the validity of theories in practice was recognized by 
Islamic physicians at least a millennium ago, this important principle is still too 
often ignored. For instance, based on untested theory, Benjamin Spock, the 
influential American child health expert, informed the readers of his bestselling 
book ‘Baby and Child Care’ that a disadvantage of babies sleeping on their 
backs was that, if they vomited, they would be more likely to choke. Dr Spock 
therefore advised his millions of readers to encourage babies to sleep on their 
tummies. We now know that this advice, apparently rational in theory, led to  
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Dr Spock’s bestselling book contained harmful advice on babies’ sleeping position.  
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the cot (crib) deaths of tens of thousands of infants. 
Another dramatic example of the dangers of applying untested theory in 
practice was found in the use of drugs to prevent heart rhythm abnormalities in 
people having heart attacks. Because heart rhythm abnormalities are associated 
with an increased risk of early death after heart attack, the theory was that drugs 
that reduced these abnormalities would also reduce early deaths. Just because a 
theory seems reasonable doesn’t prove that it is necessarily right when applied 
in practice. Years after the drugs had been licensed, it was discovered that they 
actually increase the risk of sudden death after heart attack in these patients. 
Indeed, it has been estimated that, at the peak of their use in the late 1980s, they 
may have been killing as many as 70,000 people every year in the United States 
alone – many more than the total number of Americans who died through the 
whole of the Vietnam War. 
Misplaced confidence in theoretical thinking has also resulted in some 
treatments being rejected inappropriately because researchers did not believe 
that they could work. Based on the results of experiments in rats, some 
researchers became convinced that there was no point in giving clot-dissolving 
drugs to patients who had experienced heart attacks more than six hours 
previously. Only when such patients participated in fair tests of these drugs did 
we find out that this treatment could help them survive the heart attack. 
Observations in clinical practice or in laboratory and animal research may 
suggest that treatments will or will not benefit patients; but as these and many 
other examples make clear, it is essential to use fair tests to find out whether, in 
practice, these treatments genuinely do more good than harm, or vice versa. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 1.1 Why treatment uncertainties should be addressed 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/1-1-why-treatment-uncertainties-
should-be-addressed/) 
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Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Djulbegovic B, Kumar A, Glasziou PP, Perera R, Reljic T, Dent L, 
Raftery J, Johansen M, Di Tanna GL, Miladinovic B, Soares HP, Vist 
GE, Chalmers I (2012). New treatments compared to established 
treatments in randomized trials. Cochrane Database of Systematic 
Reviews (10):MR000024 
• Perel P, Roberts I, Sena E, Wheble P, Briscoe C, Sandercock S, Macleod 
M, Mignini LE, Jayaram P, Khan KS (2007). Comparison of treatment 
effects between animal experiments and clinical trials: systematic review. 
BMJ 334:197-200 
• Price A, Albarqouni L, Kirkpatrick J, Clarke M, Liew SM, Roberts N, 
Burls A (2018). Patient and public involvement in the design of clinical 
trials: An overview of systematic reviews. Journal of Evaluation in 
Clinical Practice 24(1):240-53 
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1.2 Why treatment comparisons are essential   
 
Treatment comparisons are required to take account of the natural course of 
health problems and ‘placebo effects’, and to go beyond impressions about 
treatment effects. But treatment comparisons need to be fair to avoid 
untrustworthy and sometimes dangerously incorrect conclusions about the 
effects of treatments. 
 
The effects of nature and time? 
People often recover from illness without any specific treatment: nature and 
time are great healers. Writers over the centuries have drawn attention to the 
need to be sceptical about claims that the effects of treatments can improve on 
the effects of nature.  
As the American physician and poet Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested in the 
19th century when there were very few useful treatments,  
“I firmly believe that if the whole materia medica, as now used, could 
be sunk to the bottom of the sea, it would be all the better for mankind 
– and all the worse for the fishes.”  
Put another way, “If you leave a dose of ‘flu to nature, you’ll probably get over 
it in a week; but if you go to the doctor, you’ll recover in a mere seven days.” 
The progress and outcome of illness if left untreated must obviously be 
considered when treatments are being tested. We must take care to ensure that 
we don’t mistakenly believe the effects of time and nature are caused by a 
treatment we happened to be taking. In 1616, James V1 observed that many 
people made this mistake with tobacco smoking, thinking that their natural 
recovery from colds was due to their smoking, when in fact they would have got 
better anyway.    
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James VI of Scotland and I of England identified, in the case of people believing tobacco 
could cure illnesses, the logical fallacy of ascribing a person’s natural recovery from disease 
to whatever treatment they happened to have tried. 
Stuart, James, King of Great Britaine, France and Ireland (1616).    
A counterblaste to tobacco. In: The workes of the most high and mightie prince, James 
Published by James, Bishop of Winton, and Deane of his Majesties Chappel Royall. London: 
printed by Robert Barker and John Bill, printers to the Kings most excellent Majestie, pp 
214-222. 
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‘Placebo effects’ 
Patients and healthcare professionals hope that treatments will be helpful. These 
optimistic expectations can have a very positive effect on everybody’s 
satisfaction with health care, as the British doctor Richard Asher noted in 1959: 
“If you can believe fervently in your treatment, even though controlled 
tests show that it is quite useless, then your results are much better, 
your patients are much better, and your income is much better too. I 
believe this accounts for the remarkable success of some of the less 
gifted, but more credulous members of our profession, and also for the 
violent dislike of statistics and controlled tests which fashionable and 
successful doctors are accustomed to display.”  
In the knowledge that much illness is self-limiting, doctors sometimes prescribe 
inert treatments in the hope that their patients will derive psychological benefit 
– the so-called ‘placebo effect’. Patients who believe that a treatment will help 
to relieve their symptoms – even though the treatment, in fact, has no physical 
effects – may well feel better.   
Doctors have recognized the effect of using placebos for centuries. William 
Cullen referred to his use of a placebo as long ago as 1772, and references to 
placebos increased during the 19th century. The American physician Austin 
Flint believed that orthodox drug treatment was getting the credit due to 
‘nature’, so he gave thirteen patients with rheumatism a ‘placeboic remedy’ 
consisting of a highly dilute extract of the bark of the quassia tree. He found that 
“the favourable progress of the cases was such as to secure for the remedy 
generally the entire confidence of the patients”. At Guy’s Hospital in London, 
William Withey Gull came to similar conclusions after treating 21 rheumatic 
fever patients “for the most part with mint water”. Thus, we must ensure that 
improvements seen with remedies aren’t owing to the charisma of the clinician, 
or the expectation that the remedies will make them better. 
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Flint A (1863).   
A contribution toward the natural history of articular rheumatism; consisting of a report of 
thirteen cases treated solely with palliative measures. American Journal of the Medical 
Sciences 46:17-36. 
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The need for comparisons 
Just as the healing power of nature and the placebo effect have been recognized 
for centuries, so also has the need for comparisons to assess the effects of 
treatments over and above natural and psychologically-mediated effects.  
Sometimes, treatment comparisons are made in people’s minds: they have an 
impression that they or others are responding differently to a new treatment 
compared with previous responses to treatments. For example, Ambroise Paré, a 
16th century French military surgeon, resolved that treatment of battle wounds 
with boiling oil (as was common practice) was harmful. He concluded this 
when the supply of oil ran out and he observed that his patients recovered much 
better than those he had previously treated in the usual way.  
Most of the time, impressions like this need to be followed up by formal 
investigations, perhaps initially by analysis of healthcare records. Such 
impressions may then lead to carefully conducted comparisons. The danger 
arises when impressions alone are used as a guide to treatment 
recommendations and decisions. 
Dramatic effects and moderate effects of treatments 
Treatment comparisons based on impressions, or relatively restricted analyses, 
only provide reliable information in the rare circumstances when treatment 
effects are dramatic.  
The James Lind Library contains examples both of dramatic beneficial effects 
of treatments – for example, opium for pain relief, insulin for diabetes, liver diet 
for pernicious anaemia, sulpha drugs for infection after childbirth and 
streptomycin for tuberculous meningitis – and of dramatic harmful effects, for 
example, limb reduction deformities caused by thalidomide. Sometimes a 
treatment - sulphonamide drugs for example - can have a dramatic effect in 
some diseases, but modest or little effect in others.  
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Most medical treatments don’t have dramatic effects, however, and unless care 
is taken to avoid biased comparisons, dangerously mistaken conclusions about 
the effects of treatment may result. 
Comparisons should involve groups of people who were 
given the different treatments at more or less the same 
time  
Comparing treatments given today with treatments given in the past (historical 
controls) only rarely provides a trustworthy basis for a fair test because relevant 
factors other than the treatments themselves change over time. 
In the 1970s, Stuart Pocock, a British medical statistician, demonstrated this 
using evidence from a series of fair tests of treatments for cancer in which it 
was common practice to include the same control treatment in consecutive 
controlled trials.  This meant that it was possible to compare the death rates of 
two groups of similar patients given the same treatment at different times.  One 
would have expected little difference in the death rates associated with the same 
treatment given to apparently similar patients at different points in time.  In fact, 
the differences observed ranged from a 46% lower to a 24% higher mortality, 
and in four of these comparisons, the differences using these historical controls 
were unlikely to be explained by chance.  Presumably, although the patients and 
the treatments in the comparisons were apparently identical, there must have 
been subtle unrecognised or unmeasured differences in either the patients or the 
treatments given to them.  In the light of this demonstration of the 
untrustworthiness of treatment comparisons using historical controls, the author 
wrote that 
“Such marked evidence of differences between trials indicates that 
any comparison of treatments not within a [randomized] control trial 
must be deemed highly suspect”.   
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Comparing treatments in crossover tests in individual 
patients 
Sometimes giving different treatments at more or less the same time may 
involve giving patients different treatments one after the other – a so-called 
crossover test. Sometimes this is done in a single patient – a so-called N-of-1 
trial. 
An early example of a crossover test was reported in 1786 by Caleb Parry in 
Bath, England. He wanted to find out whether there was any reason to pay for 
expensive, imported Turkish rhubarb as a purgative for treating his patients, 
rather than using rhubarb grown locally in England. So, he ‘crossed-over’ the 
type of rhubarb given to each individual patient at different times and then 
compared the symptoms each patient experienced while eating each type of 
rhubarb.  (He didn’t find any advantage for the expensive rhubarb!) 
Treatment comparisons within individual patients have their place when their 
condition returns after stopping treatment. There are many circumstances in 
which this doesn’t apply, however. For example, it is usually impossible to 
compare different surgical operations in this way, or treatments given for 
conditions that get progressively worse over time. 
Comparing groups of patients given different treatments 
concurrently 
Treatments are usually tested by comparing groups of people who receive 
different treatments. A comparison of two treatments will be unfair if relatively 
well people have received one treatment and relatively ill people have received 
the other, so the experiences of similar groups of people who receive different 
treatments over the same period of time must be compared.  A Persian 
physician, Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn ZakariyaʾAl-Razi (known as Rhazes, in 
Latin), recognized this more than a thousand years ago. Wishing to reach a 
conclusion about how to treat patients with signs of early meningitis, he treated 
one group of patients and intentionally withheld treatment from a comparison 
group.  
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If we are to know whether or not a treatment really does make us better, we 
need comparisons of the treatment with ‘nature’ or with other treatments that 
are fair tests. If these comparisons are to be fair, they must address genuine 
uncertainties, avoid biases and the play of chance, and be interpreted carefully. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 1.2 Why treatment comparisons are essential 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/1-2-why-treatment-comparisons-are-
essential/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Clarke M, Loudon K (2011). Effects on patients of their healthcare 
practitioner's or institution's participation in clinical trials: a systematic 
review. Trials 12:16 
• Hróbjartsson A, Gøtzsche PC (2010). Placebo interventions for all 
clinical conditions. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 
(1):CD003974 
• Vist GE, Bryant D, Somerville L, Birminghem T, Oxman AD (2008). 
Outcomes of patients who participate in randomized controlled trials 
compared to similar patients receiving similar interventions who do not 
participate. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (3):MR000009 
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In the 10th century, the Persian physician Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn ZakariyaʾAl-
Razi (Rhazes) recognized the need for an untreated control group when assessing the effects 
of a treatment. 
al-Razi (10th century CE; 4th century AH)  
Kitab al-Hawi fi al-tibb [The comprehensive book of medicine]. 
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1.3 Why treatment comparisons must be fair   
Untrustworthy treatment comparisons are those in which biases, or the play of 
chance, or both result in misleading estimates of the effects of treatments. Fair 
treatment comparisons avoid biases and reduce the effects of the play of chance. 
It is not only failure to test theories about treatments in practice that has caused 
preventable tragedies. They have also occurred because the tests used to assess 
the effects of treatments have been unreliable and misleading. In the 1950s, 
theory and poorly controlled tests yielded unreliable evidence suggesting that 
diethylstilboestrol (DES) helped pregnant women who had previously had 
miscarriages and stillbirths. Although fair tests suggested that DES was useless, 
theory and unreliable evidence, together with aggressive marketing, led to DES 
being prescribed to millions of pregnant women over the next few decades. The 
consequences were disastrous for the women and their children, who 
experienced infertility and cancers as a result. The lesson is that a treatment that 
has not been reliably shown to be useful should not be promoted. 
Problems resulting from inadequate tests of treatments continue to occur. Again, 
because of unreliable evidence and aggressive marketing, millions of women 
were persuaded to use hormone replacement therapy (HRT). It was claimed 
that, not only could it reduce unpleasant menopausal symptoms, but also the 
chances of having heart attacks and strokes. When these claims were assessed in 
fair tests, the results showed that in women over 60, far from reducing the risks 
of heart attacks and strokes, HRT increases the risks of these life-threatening 
conditions, as well as having other undesirable effects. 
These examples of the need for fair tests of treatments are a few of many that 
illustrate how treatments can do more harm than good. Improved general 
knowledge about fair tests of treatments is needed so that – laced with a healthy 
dose of scepticism – we can all assess claims about the effects of treatments 
more critically. That way, we will all become more able to judge which 
treatments are likely to do more good than harm. 
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In more depth 
The James Lind Library 1.3 Why treatment comparisons must be fair 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/1-3-why-treatment-comparisons-must-
be-fair/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Anglemyer A, Horvath HT, Bero L (2014). Healthcare outcomes assessed 
with observational study designs compared with those assessed in 
randomized trials. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 
(4):MR000034 
• Dechartres A, Trinquart L, Faber T, Ravaud P (2016). Empirical 
evaluation of which trial characteristics are associated with treatment 
effect estimates. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 77:24-37 
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Section 2: Avoiding biased treatment comparisons 
What are biases? Biases in tests of treatments are those influences and factors 
that can lead to conclusions about treatment effects that are systematically 
different from the truth. 
 
Sometimes treatments have dramatic effects. These may be unintended and 
specific, for example, when a person has an allergic reaction to an antibiotic 
drug. Treatments can also have striking beneficial effects, like adrenaline for 
life-threatening allergic reactions. Such striking effects are rare, however. 
Usually, treatment effects are more modest, but nevertheless well worth 
knowing about, for example, using aspirin to reduce a person’s risks after 
having a heart attack. 
Aspirin doesn’t prevent all premature deaths after a heart attack, but it does 
reduce the likelihood of death by about twenty per cent, which is important in 
such a common condition. If such moderate but important effects are to be 
detected reliably, care must be taken to ensure that biased comparisons don’t 
lead us to believe that treatments are useful when they are useless or harmful, or 
useless when they can actually be helpful. 
Biases in tests of treatment are those influences and factors that can lead to 
conclusions about treatment effects that are systematically different from the 
truth. Many kinds of biases can distort the results of health research. This book 
considers design bias, allocation bias, co-intervention bias, observer 
bias, analysis bias, biases in assessing unanticipated effects, reporting 
biases, biases in systematic reviews, and research biases and fraud. 
Usually, the unfair tests of treatment resulting from these biases are not 
recognised for what they are. However, people with vested interests sometimes 
exploit these biases so that treatments are presented as if they are better than 
they really are. 
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Whether biases are inadvertent or deliberate, the consequences are the same: 
unless tests of treatment are fair, some useless or harmful treatments will seem 
to be useful, while some useful treatments will seem useless or harmful. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 2.0 Avoiding biased treatment comparisons 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-0-avoiding-biased-treatment-
comparisons/) 
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2.1 Why comparisons must address genuine 
uncertainties   
The design of treatment research often reflects commercial and academic 
interests; ignores relevant existing evidence; uses comparison treatments known 
in advance to be inferior; and ignores the needs of users of research results 
(patients, health professionals and others). 
 
A good deal of research is done even when there are no genuine uncertainties. 
Researchers who fail to conduct systematic reviews of past tests of treatments 
before embarking on further studies sometimes don’t recognise (or choose to 
ignore the fact) that uncertainties about treatment effects have already been 
convincingly addressed. This means that people participating in research are 
sometimes denied treatment that could help them or given treatment that is 
likely to harm them. 
For example, fair tests have been done to assess whether antibiotics (compared 
with inactive placebos) reduce the risk of people dying after bowel surgery. The 
first fair test was reported in 1969, but the results of this small study left 
uncertainty about whether antibiotics were useful. Quite properly, this 
uncertainty was addressed in further tests. 
As the evidence accumulated, however, it became clear that antibiotics reduce 
the risk of death after surgery, yet researchers continued to do additional 
studies. The patients who received placebos in these later studies were thus 
denied a form of care which had been shown to reduce their risk of dying after 
their operations. How could this have happened? It was probably because 
researchers continued to embark on research without reviewing existing 
evidence systematically. This behaviour remains all too common in the research 
community, partly because some of the incentives in the world of research – 
commercial and academic – do not put the interests of patients first. 
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Adding the data from the large, prospective randomized trial (MRC CRASH) revealed that 
corticosteroid treatment in preterm infants was harmful, in spite of the large number of 
small-scale studies that had reported unclear results.  
Crowley P, Chalmers I, Keirse MJNC (1990). The effects of corticosteroid administration 
before preterm delivery: an overview of the evidence from controlled trials. British Journal of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 97:11-25.   
 The James Lind Library’s Introduction to Fair Tests of Treatments 
 
 29 
 
Patients and participants in research can also suffer because researchers have 
not systematically reviewed relevant evidence from animal research before 
beginning to test treatments in humans. A Dutch team reviewed the experience 
of over 7000 patients who had participated in tests of a new drug given to 
people experiencing a stroke. They found no evidence to support its increasing 
use in practice. This made them wonder about the quality and findings of the 
animal research that had led to the research on patients. Their review of the 
animal studies revealed that these had never suggested that the drug would be 
useful in humans. 
The most common reason that research does not address genuine uncertainties 
is that researchers simply have not been sufficiently disciplined to review 
relevant existing evidence systematically before embarking on new studies. 
Sometimes there are more sinister reasons, however. Researchers may be aware 
of existing evidence, but they want to design studies to ensure that their own 
research will yield favourable results for particular treatments. Usually, but not 
always, this is for commercial reasons. These studies are deliberately designed 
to be unfair tests of treatments. This can be done by giving comparison 
treatments in inappropriately low doses (so that they don’t work so well), or in 
inappropriately high doses (so that they have more unwanted side effects). It 
can also result from following up patients for too short a time (and missing 
delayed effects of treatments), and by using outcome measures (‘surrogates’) 
that have little or no correlation with the outcomes that matter to patients. 
It may come as a surprise that the research ethics committees established to 
ensure that research is ethical have done so little to influence this research 
malpractice. Most such committees have let down the people they should have 
been protecting because they have not required researchers and sponsors 
seeking approval for new tests to have reviewed existing evidence 
systematically. The failure of research ethics committees to protect patients and 
the public efficiently in this way emphasizes the importance of improving 
general knowledge about the characteristics of fair tests of medical treatments. 
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In more depth 
The James Lind Library 2.1 Why comparisons must address genuine 
uncertainties (http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-1-why-comparisons-
must-address-genuine-uncertainties/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Clarke M, Brice A, Chalmers I (2014). Accumulating research: a 
systematic account of how cumulative meta-analyses would have 
provided knowledge, improved health, reduced harm and saved 
resources. PLoS ONE 9(7):e102670 
• Martínez García L, Pardo-Hernandez H, Superchi C, Niño de Guzman E, 
Ballesteros M, Ibargoyen Roteta N, McFarlane E, Posso M, Roqué I 
Figuls M, Rotaeche Del Campo R, Sanabria AJ, Selva A, Solà I, Vernooij 
RWM, Alonso-Coello P (2017). Methodological systematic review 
identifies major limitations in prioritization processes for updating. 
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 86:11-24 
• Tricco AC, Tetzlaff J, Sampson M, Fergusson D, Cogo E, Horsley T, 
Moher D (2008). Few systematic reviews exist documenting the extent of 
bias: a systematic review. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 61(5):422-34 
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2.2 The need to compare like with like in treatment 
comparisons  
Allocation bias results when treatment comparisons fail to ensure that, apart 
from the treatments being compared, ‘like will be compared with like’. 
 
Comparing different treatments given to groups of people 
Treatment comparisons usually entail comparing the experiences of groups of 
people who have received different treatments. If these comparisons are to be 
fair, the composition of the groups must be similar – so that ‘like will be 
compared with like’. If those who receive one treatment are more likely anyway 
to do well (or badly) than those receiving an alternative treatment, this 
allocation bias makes it impossible to be confident that outcomes reflect 
differential effects of the treatments, rather than the effects of ‘nature’ and the 
passage of time. 
It is rarely possible to be completely confident that groups of people assembled 
in the past who have been given one treatment are comparable in all the respects 
that matter with people who have more recently received a treatment. This is the 
case even if some information about the patients who have received these 
treatments is available (such as their ages, or their history of illness). Other 
information that may be of great importance (such as the likelihood of 
spontaneous recovery) may simply not be available. 
A better approach is to plan the treatment comparisons before starting treatment. 
For example, before beginning his comparison of six treatments for scurvy on 
board HMS Salisbury in 1747, James Lind took care to select patients who were 
at a similar stage of this often-fatal disease. He also ensured that they had the 
same basic diet and were accommodated in similar conditions. These were 
factors, other than treatment, that might have influenced their likelihood of 
recovering.  
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In 1747, James Lind, a Scottish naval surgeon faced with uncertainty about which of many 
proposed treatments for scurvy to use, compared six of them in a prospective controlled trial. 
Lind J (1753).    
A treatise of the scurvy. In three parts. Containing an inquiry into the nature, causes and cure, 
of that disease. Together with a critical and chronological view of what has been published on 
the subject. Edinburgh: Printed by Sands, Murray and Cochran for A Kincaid and A 
Donaldson. 
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The 18th century surgeon William Cheselden was aware of the ‘dissimilar 
groups’ problem when surgeons were comparing their respective mortality rates 
after operations to remove bladder stones. Cheselden pointed out that it was 
important to take account of the ages of the people treated by different surgeons. 
He drew attention to the fact that mortality rates varied with the patients’ ages: 
older patients were more likely than younger patients to die. This meant that, if 
one wished to compare the frequency of deaths in groups of patients who had 
undergone different types of operation, one had to take account of differences in 
the ages of the patients in the comparison groups. 
Unbiased assembly of treatment comparison groups using 
alternation or randomisation 
Although Lind took care to ensure that the sailors in his six comparison groups 
were alike, he didn’t describe how he decided which sailors would receive 
which of the six treatments. There is only one way to ensure that treatment 
comparison groups are set up in such a way that they are similar in all the ways 
that matter, known and unknown. This is by using some form of chance process 
to assemble treatment comparison groups. 
One hundred years after Lind, the British physician Thomas Graham Balfour 
illustrated how this could be done in a test to see whether belladonna prevented 
scarlet fever in children. In the military orphanage for which he was 
responsible, he used alternation to decide which boys would receive and which 
would not receive belladonna. During the first half of the 20th century, there 
were many examples of treatment comparison groups being assembled using 
alternation, or by drawing lots (for example, by using dice, coloured beads, or 
random sampling numbers). This ‘random allocation’ is the only, albeit 
crucially important, feature of the category of fair tests referred to as 
‘randomized’.  
Casting or drawing lots is a time-honoured way of making fair decisions, and 
when used in tests of treatments, these methods help to ensure that comparison 
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groups are composed of similar types of people. Known and measured factors 
of importance, like age, can be checked. Moreover, unmeasured factors that 
may influence recovery from illness (such as diet, occupation, and anxiety) can 
be expected to balance out on average.  
It’s possible to undermine random allocation if the researchers in a study know 
which treatment a particular patient is going to get when participants are 
recruited to the trial.  For example, this knowledge might influence a doctor’s 
decision on whether or not to offer the patient the chance to participate in the 
trial.    
Strict adherence to unbiased allocation schedules is required to avoid biased 
creation of treatment comparison groups. The risk of biased allocation can be 
abolished if treatment allocation schedules are concealed from those making 
decisions about participation in treatment comparisons – in brief, to prevent 
them cheating, and thus biasing the assembly of comparison groups.  
Avoiding biased losses from treatment comparison groups 
After taking the trouble to ensure that treatment comparison groups are 
assembled in ways that ensure that like will be compared with like, it is 
important to avoid bias being introduced by selective withdrawal of patients 
from the comparison groups. As far as possible, group similarity should be 
maintained by ensuring that all the people allocated to the treatment comparison 
groups are followed up and included in the main analysis of the test results – a 
so-called ‘intention-to-treat’ analysis. 
Failure to do this can result in unfair tests of treatments. Take, for example, two 
very different ways of treating people experiencing dizzy spells because of 
partially blocked blood vessels supplying their brains. Treatment for this 
condition can be important because people experiencing such dizzy spells are at 
increased risk of suffering a stroke.  One of the treatments involves taking 
aspirin to stop the blockage from getting worse; the other involves a surgical 
operation to try to remove the blockage in the blood vessel. 
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A fair comparison of these two approaches to treating dizzy spells would 
involve creating two groups of people using an unbiased allocation method (like 
random allocation), and then treating patients in one group with surgery and 
patients in the other group with aspirin. The comparison would thus begin by 
comparing two groups of patients who were alike, and go on to compare their 
respective frequencies of subsequent strokes. But if the frequency of strokes in 
the surgically treated group was only recorded among patients who had 
survived the immediate effects of the operation, the important fact that the 
operation itself can cause stroke and death would be missed. This would result 
in an unfair comparison of the two treatments, resulting in a biased and 
misleadingly optimistic picture of the effects of the operation. Like would not 
be being compared with like. 
The principal comparison must be based as far as possible on all the people 
assigned to receive each of the treatments compared, without exceptions, and in 
the groups to which they were originally assigned. If this principle is not 
observed, people may receive biased information about the overall effects of 
treatments. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 2.2 The need to compare like-with-like in treatment 
comparisons (http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-2-the-need-to-compare-
like-with-like-in-treatment-comparisons/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Bello S, Wei M, Hilden J, Hróbjartsson A (2016). The matching quality 
of experimental and control interventions in blinded pharmacological 
randomised clinical trials: a methodological systematic review. BMC 
Medical Research Methodology 16:18 
• MacLehose RR, Reeves BC, Harvey IM, Sheldon TA, Russell IT, Black 
AM (2000). A systematic review of comparisons of effect sizes derived 
 The James Lind Library’s Introduction to Fair Tests of Treatments 
 
 36 
 
from randomised and non-randomised studies. Health Technology 
Assessment 4(34):1-154. 
• Odgaard-Jensen J, Vist GE, Timmer A, Kunz R, Akl EA, Schünemann H, 
Briel M, Nordmann AJ, Pregno S, Oxman AD (2011). Randomisation to 
protect against selection bias in healthcare trials. Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews (4):MR000012 
• Wood L, Egger M, Gluud LL, Schulz KF, Jüni P, Altman DG, Gluud C, 
Martin RM, Wood AJ, Sterne JA (2008). Empirical evidence of bias in 
treatment effect estimates in controlled trials with different interventions 
and outcomes: meta-epidemiological study. BMJ 336(7644):601-5. 
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Any change to the composition of the comparison groups after randomization can bias the 
results.  This is one reason why patients should be analyzed in the groups to which they were 
originally assigned. 
Evans I, Thornton H, Chalmers I & Glasziou P (2011).   
Testing Treatments, 2nd Edition.  London:  Pinter and Martin  
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2.3 Why avoiding differences between treatments 
allocated and treatments received is 
important  
Knowledge of which treatments have been received by which study participants 
can affect adherence to assigned treatments and result in biased use of other 
treatments (co-interventions). These biases can be reduced by using placebos to 
conceal the identities of the treatments being compared. 
 
Fair tests of medical treatments must be planned carefully. The documents 
setting out these plans are referred to as protocols, and, among other things, they 
specify details about the treatments that will be compared. The best laid plans 
don’t always work out quite as intended, however. The treatments actually 
received by patients in tests sometimes differ from those it was intended they 
should have received. These departures from intention need to be considered 
when interpreting the results of treatment comparisons. One of the reasons 
that placebos were introduced in the evolution of fair tests of medical treatments 
was to reduce departures from the test’s intended treatments. 
Things may go astray even in placebo-controlled trials, however. During World 
War II, people suffering from colds were given a solution of a drug called 
patulin and compared with other people given only the fluid in which the drug 
had been dissolved. Analysis of the results didn’t reveal any beneficial effects 
of the drug, but a concern then emerged that the liquid used to dissolve the drug 
might have inactivated the drug. In other words, over 1000 patients might have 
participated in a comparison of two inactive treatments! Fortunately, tests 
confirmed that the patulin used in the trial had indeed been active, although it 
had no detectable effects on colds! 
Treatments received may differ from treatments intended for a variety of 
reasons. For example, doctors may decide that the treatment to which some of 
their patients have been allocated in a formal treatment comparison should not  
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Husband and wife Philip and Ruth d’Arcy Hart, along with colleagues in the UK Medical 
Research Council (MRC) designed, conducted and reported the MRC’s first well controlled 
multicentre trial, during World War 2. They are pictured here at their home in 2003, 60 years 
after working together on the patulin trial and the month before Philip's 103rd birthday. 
Medical Research Council (1944)  
Clinical trial of patulin in the common cold. Lancet 2:373-5. 
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be offered to them; patients may reject the treatments allocated to them, or not 
take them as intended; doses of the treatment that differed from those intended 
may be given; or the supply of one of the treatments may run out. 
For example, when differences emerged in the results of apparently identical 
treatments for leukaemia in British and American children, investigation 
revealed that the worse results in Britain reflected unwillingness among British 
clinicians to persist with chemotherapy when nasty side effects of treatment 
developed. 
For these reasons, interpretations of fair tests must consider the possibility that 
treatments received were not those intended, or that additional treatments were 
given to patients in one treatment comparison group than to those in another. If 
discrepancies between intention and practice have occurred, it is important to 
consider the possible implications for interpreting the evidence. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 2.3 Why avoiding differences between treatments 
allocated and treatments received is important 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-3-why-avoiding-differences-
between-treatments-allocated-and-treatments-received-is-important/) 
No methodology reviews were identified for this section. 
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2.4 The need to avoid differences in the way 
treatment outcomes are assessed  
Biased treatment outcome assessment can result if the people receiving or 
providing care, or those assessing treatment outcomes, know which participants 
have received which treatments. It is sometimes possible to conceal which 
treatments have been received by using placebos and in other ways. 
 
Using blinding to reduce bias when assessing treatment 
outcomes 
For some outcomes used to assess treatment – survival, for example – biased 
assessment is very unlikely because there is little room for opinion. This was the 
case in some of the 18th century tests of surgical procedures, where survival 
was the main measure of treatment success or failure. 
The assessment of most other outcomes, however, often involves subjectivity 
(as with patients’ symptoms). The biases that lead to these misperceptions of 
symptom relief or exacerbation are termed observer biases. They cause a 
problem, particularly when people have special reasons for preferring one of the 
treatments being compared. When measures are not taken to reduce biased 
outcome assessments in treatment comparisons, treatment effects tend to be 
overestimated. The greater the element of subjectivity in assessing outcomes, 
the greater the need to reduce these observer biases to ensure fair tests of 
treatments. 
In these common circumstances, ‘blinding’ (sometimes called ‘masking’, 
especially in tests of treatments involving eyes) of patients and doctors is a 
desirable element of fair tests. What appears to have been the earliest blinded 
assessment of a treatment was done by a commission of inquiry appointed by 
Louis XVI in 1784 to investigate Anton Mesmer’s claims about the effects of 
‘animal magnetism’. The Commission assessed whether the purported effects of 
this new healing method were due to any ‘real’ force, or due to the ‘illusions of  
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Antoine Lavoisier, Benjamin Franklin and others in Paris assessed the effects of Franz 
Mesmer’s animal magnetism by blindfolding patients to whom it was applied. 
Commission Royale. Bailly A (1784)  
Rapport des commissaires chargés par le Roi, de l'examen du magnétisme animale [Report of 
the Commissioners required by the King to examine animal magnetism]. Imprimé par ordre 
du Roi. Paris: A Paris, de L'Imprimerie Royale. 
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the mind’. Blindfolded people were told that they were receiving or not 
receiving magnetism.  In fact, at times, the reverse was happening. The people 
being studied felt the effects of ‘animal magnetism’ only when they were told 
they were receiving the treatment, but not otherwise. 
Using placebos to achieve blinding 
A few years later, John Haygarth of Bath conducted an experiment using a sham 
device (a placebo) to achieve blinding. An American quack – Elisha Perkins - 
claimed that his small metal rods (‘tractors’) cured a variety of ailments through 
‘electrophysical force’. In a pamphlet entitled ‘Of the imagination as a cause 
and as a cure of disorders of the body: exemplified by fictitious tractors’, 
Haygarth reported how, in patients who were unaware of the details of his 
evaluation, he compared the metal tractors with wooden ‘tractors’ that looked 
identical to them (what we would consider ‘placebo tractors’). Haygarth was 
unable to detect any benefit of Perkins’ metal tractors. 
It was not until much later that a more sceptical attitude in mainstream medicine 
led to a recognition that there was a more general need to adopt blinded 
assessment and placebos to assess the validity of its claims.   
Inspired principally by pharmacologists, German researchers gradually adopted 
blind assessment. For example, in 1918, Adolf Bingel reported that he had tried 
to make his comparison of two different treatments for diphtheria "as objective 
as possible”. He assessed whether he or his colleagues could guess which 
patients had received which treatment: “I have not relied on my own judgment 
alone but have sought the views of the assistant physicians of the diphtheria 
ward, without informing them about the nature of the serum under test" and 
noted that "their judgment was thus completely without prejudice", although it 
may still have been contradictory or inconsistent. He also noted how he used a 
quantitative analysis because "I am keen to see my observations checked 
independently, and most warmly recommend this ‘blind’ method for the 
purpose”; and, in fact, he did not detect a difference between the two treatments. 
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Harry Gold (centre, in a photograph from 1955) and Ella Hediger had earlier described a 
“blind test” to ensure that anaesthetists’ judgments about the effectiveness of anaesthesia 
would not be biased by their knowledge of which type was being used. 
Hediger E, Gold H (1935)  
USP ether from large drums and ether from small cans labelled ‘For Anesthesia’. JAMA 
104:2244-2448. 
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Blind assessment in the modern English-speaking world first began when 
researchers were influenced by the German tradition, as well as by an 
indigenous ‘quackbuster’ movement that used masked treatment outcome 
assessment. 
By the 1930s, anglophone researchers had taken up the use of placebo controls 
in clinical experiments. For example, two of the UK Medical Research 
Council’s earliest fair tests were of treatments for the common cold, including 
the study of patulin mentioned in the last chapter. It would have been very 
difficult to interpret their results had what would later be termed ‘double 
blinding’ not been used to prevent patients and doctors knowing which patients 
had received the new drugs and which had received placebos. In the 1960s, 
‘double dummies’ were introduced when two very different treatments – an 
injection and a pill, for example – were being compared.  In these studies, 
injected drugs are compared with injected placebo while a swallowed tablet is 
compared with an identical-looking placebo tablet. 
Blinding observers when it is impossible to blind patients 
and clinicians 
Sometimes it is simply impossible to blind patients and doctors to the identity of 
the treatments being compared, for example, when surgical treatments are 
compared with drug treatments, or with no treatment. Even in these 
circumstances, however, steps can be taken to reduce biased assessment of 
treatment outcomes. Independent observers can be kept unaware of which 
treatments have been received by which patients. For example, in the mid-1940s 
a test compared patients with pulmonary tuberculosis receiving the then 
standard treatment – bed rest – with other patients who received, in addition, 
injections of the drug streptomycin. The researchers felt that it would be 
unethical to inject inactive placebos in patients allocated to bed rest alone 
simply to achieve ‘blinding’ of the patients and doctors treating them, but they 
took alternative precautions to reduce biased assessment of outcomes. Although 
there was little danger of biased assessment of the principal outcome (survival), 
subjectivity could have biased the assessment of the chest X-rays. Accordingly, 
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X-rays were assessed by doctors who were kept unaware of whether they were 
evaluating a patient who had been treated with streptomycin or one treated with 
bed rest alone. 
Together with randomization, blinded (masked) assessment, when possible 
using placebos, has now become one of the crucial methodological components 
of fair tests of treatments. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 2.4 The need to avoid differences in the way treatment 
outcomes are assessed (http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-4-the-need-to-
avoid-differences-in-the-way-treatment-outcomes-are-assessed/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Boutron I, Estellat C, Ravaud P (2005). A review of blinding in 
randomized controlled trials found results inconsistent and questionable. 
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 58(12):1220-6 
• Hróbjartsson A, Emanuelsson F, Skou Thomsen AS, Hilden J, Brorson S 
(2014). Bias due to lack of patient blinding in clinical trials. A systematic 
review of trials randomizing patients to blind and nonblind sub-studies. 
International Journal of Epidemiology 43(4):1272-83 
• Hróbjartsson A, Gøtzsche PC (2010). Placebo interventions for all 
clinical conditions. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 
(1):CD003974 
• Hróbjartsson A, Thomsen AS, Emanuelsson F, Tendal B, Hilden J, 
Boutron I, Ravaud P, Brorson S (2012). Observer bias in randomised 
clinical trials with binary outcomes: systematic review of trials with both 
blinded and non-blinded outcome assessors. BMJ 344:e1119  
• Hróbjartsson A, Thomsen AS, Emanuelsson F, Tendal B, Hilden J, 
Boutron I, Ravaud P, Brorson S (2013). Observer bias in randomized 
clinical trials with measurement scale outcomes: a systematic review of 
trials with both blinded and nonblinded assessors. CMAJ 185(4):E201-11 
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• Hróbjartsson A, Thomsen AS, Emanuelsson F, Tendal B, Rasmussen JV, 
Hilden J, Boutron I, Ravaud P, Brorson S (2014). Observer bias in 
randomized clinical trials with time-to-event outcomes: systematic review 
of trials with both blinded and non-blinded outcome assessors. 
International Journal of Epidemiology 43(3):937-48 
• Ndounga Diakou LA, Trinquart L, Hróbjartsson A, Barnes C, Yavchitz 
A, Ravaud P, Boutron I (2016). Comparison of central adjudication of 
outcomes and onsite outcome assessment on treatment effect estimates. 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (3):MR000043 
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2.5 Bias introduced after looking at study results  
Biases can be introduced when knowledge of the results of studies influences 
analysis and reporting decisions, for example, when studies stop earlier than 
planned, or if there is bias in the selection of the treatment outcomes analyzed. 
 
Biased analyses before the planned end of a study 
Biases can result from informal observations of accumulating data and from 
doing formal statistical analyses before the full study results are known. As an 
example of the former, if researchers are collecting or observing outcomes 
because they are providing treatment for participants in a study, they may have 
developed a sense of which patients are doing particularly well or badly. This 
may lead them to alter the planned analyses by changing their views about what 
constitutes the “most important” outcomes, or by dredging through the data for 
what might be regarded as significant differences. The risk of these biases can 
be reduced if the researchers and the practitioners are kept blinded to which 
treatment was allocated to each participant. 
When study results are being analysed more formally, different problems can 
arise. While a study is still in progress, accumulating results might be examined 
to see if there is clear evidence of benefit or harm for one of the treatments 
being compared, and so make it unethical to continue the study. On the other 
hand, it may become clear that the hoped-for effect is unlikely to be achieved in 
the study and that it would therefore be better to stop the study for ‘futility’. 
These early stopping decisions can lead to bias when the interim results happen 
to be ‘high’ or ‘low’ simply by chance. The danger of bias is greater if there are 
vested interests in stopping the study and presenting interim results as if they 
were final results. 
Systematic reviews of the impact of stopping trials earlier than envisaged have 
shown how early stopping might bias conclusions about the effects of 
treatments. Interim analyses may have shown implausibly large treatment  
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In the DICE 1 study, Carl Counsell and colleagues showed how some fairly simple, but 
common, manipulations to the analyses of 44 unbiased randomised trials simulated by rolling 
dice could end up with a biased conclusion that specific dice rolled by specific people 
reduced deaths following a stroke by 39%. 
Counsell CE, Clarke MJ, Slattery J, Sandercock PAG (1994)  
The miracle of DICE therapy for acute stroke: fact or fictional product of subgroup analysis? 
BMJ 309:1677-1681. 
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effects, particularly when the number of events was small. On average, trials 
that stopped early were found to be more favourable to treatments than those 
from similar trials that did not stop early. 
One way to avoid biases that might arise if the researchers themselves are 
responsible for these interim decisions is to establish an independent Data 
Monitoring Committee which looks at the interim analyses in confidence, acting 
as an oversight group for the study. 
Biased analyses after the planned end of a study 
Things can get even more problematic after the full study results are known. 
Biased changes may then be made because analysts know how these changes 
would favour one or other of the treatments compared. If biased changes occur 
between the collection of the study data and their eventual reporting, readers of 
the published results will be unaware of them, and risk being misled.   
At the end of a study, changes to the analyses after looking at the results can 
lead to bias through: 
• changes in the designated primary outcome, or in how outcomes are 
defined or combined in composite outcomes; 
• introduction of subgroup analyses, in which different groups of 
participants are analysed separately, perhaps to highlight the presence or 
absence of benefit in certain types of person or setting;  
• selective reporting of particular outcomes, analyses or treatment 
comparisons; and 
• changes to the statistical techniques, such as the introduction of 
adjustments for differences in baseline characteristics of the participants 
which had not been pre-planned or pre-specified. 
The potential impact of some of these biases has been studied, and some of 
these studies have themselves been considered in systematic reviews. These 
have shown that discrepancies in analyses between publications and other study 
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documentation are common, but not discussed in the trial reports. For example, 
prespecified primary outcomes were changed or introduced in about half of the 
studies analysed by these reviews.  
In more depth 
The James Lind Library   Bias introduced after looking at study results 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-5-bias-introduced-after-looking-at-
study-results/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Bassler D, Briel M, Montori VM, Lane M, Glasziou P, Zhou Q, Heels-
Ansdell D, Walter SD, Guyatt GH; STOPIT-2 Study Group (2010). 
Stopping randomized trials early for benefit and estimation of treatment 
effects: systematic review and meta-regression analysis. JAMA 
303:1180-7 
• Dwan K, Altman DG, Cresswell L, Blundell M, Gamble CL, Williamson 
PR (2011). Comparison of protocols and registry entries to published 
reports for randomised controlled trials. Cochrane Database of Systematic 
Reviews (1):MR000031 
• Montori VM, Devereaux PJ, Adhikari NK, Burns KE, Eggert CH, Briel 
M, Lacchetti C, Leung TW, Darling E, Bryant DM, Bucher HC, 
Schunemann HJ, Meade MO, Cook DJ, Erwin PJ, Sood A, Sood R, Lo B, 
Thompson CA, Zhou Q, Mills E, Guyatt GH (2005). Randomized trials 
stopped early for benefit: a systematic review. JAMA 294:2203-9 
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2.6 Reducing biases in judging unanticipated 
possible treatment effects  
Important unanticipated effects of treatments are often first suspected by people 
using or prescribing treatments. As with anticipated effects of treatments, steps 
must be taken to reduce biases and the play of chance in assessing suspected 
unanticipated effects. 
 
It is only to be expected that unanticipated effects of treatments will emerge 
when new treatments are introduced more widely. Initial tests – for example, 
those required to license new drugs for marketing – cover at most a few hundred 
or a few thousand people treated for a few months. Only relatively frequent and 
short-term unanticipated effects are likely to be picked up at this stage. 
Rare treatment effects, or those that take some time to develop, will not be 
discovered until studies have lasted long enough or until there has been more 
widespread use of treatments. Moreover, new treatments will often be used in 
people who may differ in important ways from those who participated in the 
original tests. They may be older or younger, of a different sex, more or less ill, 
living in different circumstances, or suffering from other health problems in 
addition to the condition targeted by the treatment. These differences may 
modify treatment effects, and new, unanticipated effects may emerge. 
Detection and verification of unanticipated effects of treatments, whether 
adverse or beneficial, usually occur rather differently from the methods used to 
assess hoped-for effects of new treatments. Unanticipated effects of treatments 
are sometimes suspected initially by health professionals or patients. Identifying 
which among these initial hunches reflect real effects of treatments poses a 
challenge. 
If the unanticipated effect of a treatment is very striking and occurs quite often 
after the treatment has been used, it may be noticed spontaneously by health  
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McBride WG (1961)  
Thalidomide and congenital abnormalities. Lancet 2:1358. 
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professionals or patients. For example, babies born without limbs are almost 
unheard of, so when a sudden increase in their numbers occurred in the 1960s it 
raised concerns. All mothers of such babies had used a newly marketed anti-
nausea drug – thalidomide – prescribed during early pregnancy, so this was 
likely to be the cause, and little further assessment was necessary. Unanticipated 
beneficial effects of drugs are often detected in similar ways, for example, when 
it was found that a drug to treat psychosis also lowered cholesterol. 
When such striking relationships are noticed, they often turn out to be 
confirmed to be real, unanticipated effects of treatment. However, a lot of 
hunches about unanticipated effects of treatment are based on far less 
convincing evidence. So, as with tests designed to detect hoped-for effects of 
treatments, planning tests to confirm or dismiss less striking suspected 
unanticipated effects involves avoiding biased comparisons. Studies to test 
whether suspected unanticipated effects of treatment are real must observe the 
principle of comparing ‘like with like’.  
Random allocation to treatments is the ideal way to accomplish this. Only 
rarely, however, can possible treatment effects be investigated by further 
analysis or follow-up of people who had been randomly allocated to the 
treatment before it was given to them. The challenge is therefore to assemble 
unbiased comparison groups in other ways (for example, retrospective 
comparison), often using information collected routinely during health care. 
In these studies, it is helpful that the suspected effect was not anticipated at the 
time that treatment decisions were taken. This is because it means that no 
account could have been taken of the risk of the suspected effect when people 
were being selected differentially for treatment. This is most likely when the 
unanticipated effect is a different condition or disease from the condition or 
disease for which the treatment was prescribed. 
For example, when hormone replacement therapy (HRT) was introduced for 
treating menopausal symptoms in the 1960s a woman’s risk of developing 
venous thrombosis was unlikely to have been considered because most doctors 
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and women thought it was irrelevant. There was therefore no reason to expect 
that women who were prescribed HRT differed in their risk of developing 
venous thrombosis from those who did not receive the drug. This created the 
circumstances for fair tests, and these showed that HRT increases the risk of 
venous thrombosis.  
When a suspected unanticipated effect concerns a treatment and its relationship 
to a common health problem (such as heart attack) but does not occur very often 
with the treatment, large-scale surveillance of people receiving the treatment is 
needed to detect the unanticipated effect. For example, although some people 
thought in the 1960s that aspirin might reduce the risk of heart attack, most 
people would have thought that the theory was highly implausible. The 
breakthrough came when a large study was done in Boston, USA, to detect 
unanticipated adverse effects of drugs: researchers noticed that people admitted 
to hospital with heart attacks were less likely to have recently taken aspirin than 
apparently similar patients. These findings were consistent with those of a 
subsequent fair test, in which people were allocated at random to receive or not 
receive aspirin after heart attack.  
The ground rules for detecting and investigating unanticipated effects of 
treatments were first set out clearly in the late 1970s. They drew on the 
collective experience of investigating unanticipated effects which had 
accumulated following the thalidomide disaster. With many powerful 
treatments introduced since that time, this aspect of fair tests of treatments 
remains just as challenging and important today as it did then. 
It is important to recognise that individual reports suggesting or dismissing 
suspicions about unanticipated effects of treatments can be misleading. As with 
all other fair tests of treatment, possible unanticipated effects of treatment must 
be investigated using systematic reviews of all the relevant evidence, such as 
those that confirmed the relationship between the use of HRT and heart disease, 
stroke and breast cancer. 
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In more depth 
The James Lind Library 2.6 Reducing biases in judging unanticipated possible 
treatment effects (http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-6-reducing-biases-
in-judging-unanticipated-possible-treatment-effects/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Allen EN, Chandler CIR, Mandimika N, Leisegang C, Barnes K (2018). 
Eliciting adverse effects data from participants in clinical trials. Cochrane 
Database of Systematic Reviews (1):MR000039 
• Golder S, Loke YK (2010). Sources of information on adverse effects: a 
systematic review. Health Information and Libraries Journal 27(3):176-
90. 
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2.7 Dealing with biased reporting of the available 
evidence  
Biased reporting of research occurs when the direction or statistical significance 
of results influences whether and how research is reported. 
 
Avoiding biased comparisons entails using systematic reviews to identify and 
take account of all the relevant, reliable evidence. This is challenging in many 
ways, particularly because what evidence is available might be influenced by 
biased decisions about which results of research are submitted and accepted for 
publication. Studies that have yielded ‘disappointing’ or ‘negative’ results are 
less likely to be reported than others. This is often called ‘publication bias’ or 
‘reporting bias’.  
These reporting biases have been recognized for centuries. In 1792, for 
example, the Scottish physician John Ferriar stressed the importance of 
recording treatment failures as well as treatment successes. This principle was 
reiterated in an editorial published in the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 
just over a century later. 
There is now a large amount of evidence confirming that reporting bias is a 
substantial problem. There is also evidence that reporting bias results 
principally from researchers not writing up or submitting reports of research for 
publication, not because of biased rejection of their reports by journal editors, 
among other reasons, because of vested interests. Recent research has also 
revealed an additional problem: if the observed effects of treatments on some of 
the outcomes studied don’t support the (hoped-for) conclusions of researchers, 
these data sometimes don’t get reported either. 
For example, had all the studies of the effects of giving drugs to reduce heart 
rhythm abnormalities in patients having heart attacks been reported, tens of 
thousands of deaths from these drugs could have been avoided.  
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“The whole tribe of diuretics is acknowledged to be uncertain,  
and often to disappoint the most rational expectations.  
Practitioners are therefore perpetually in search of new remedies belonging to this class, and 
are too apt to over-rate the value of such discoveries” 
Ferriar J (1792)  
Medical histories and reflections. Vol 1. London: Cadell and Davies. 
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In 1993, Alan Cowley and his colleagues pointed out how an unpublished study 
done 13 years previously might have “provided an early warning of trouble 
ahead”. Nine patients had died among the 49 assigned to a new anti-arrhythmic 
drug compared with only one patient among a similar number given placebos. 
“When we carried out our study in 1980”, they reported, “we thought that the 
increased death rate was an effect of chance…The development of lorcainide 
was abandoned for commercial reasons, and this study was therefore never 
published; it is now a good example of ‘publication bias’”. 
Reporting biases tend to lead to conclusions that medical treatments are more 
useful and freer of side effects than they are in fact. As a consequence, they can 
result in unnecessary suffering and death, and in wasted resources spent on 
ineffective or dangerous treatments.  
People who agree to researchers’ requests that they participate in tests of 
treatments assume that their participation will lead to an increase in knowledge. 
This implied contract between researchers and participants in research is 
breached by researchers who do not make public the results of the research. 
Biased under-reporting of research is scientific misconduct and unethical. 
Research ethics committees, medical ethicists and research funders have so far 
not done enough to protect patients and the public from the adverse effects of 
reporting biases. Fair testing of treatments will remain compromised as long as 
this form of research misconduct is tolerated by governments and others who 
should be protecting the interests of the public. 
Among others, the World Health Organization has coordinated solutions to 
address the problem of unidentifiable research and publication bias. First, it 
established standards for the registration and exchange of data for the 
registration of trials. Second, it proposed registration of research protocols in 
databases that fulfil the above standards, before patient recruitment starts. 
Finally, it established a freely accessible portal that collates information from 
national and regional registers, making it easier for people to learn about 
anticipated, ongoing and finished research protocols.  
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Using drug research done during the late 1970s, Elina Hemminki, a Finnish health services 
researcher, showed that studies of new drugs submitted to licensing authorities were less 
likely to be published subsequently if they had looked for adverse effects. 
Hemminki E (1980).  
Study of information submitted by drug companies to licensing authorities. BMJ 280:833-6. 
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Although registration addresses the problem of unidentifiable research by 
letting people know what research is planned, ongoing or completed, it is only 
by providing the results of this research that publication bias can be overcome. 
In recent years, some research registries have started to include study findings, 
but uptake of this option by researchers remains incomplete and inadequate as a 
means of ensuring that the findings of all trials are publicly available.  
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 2.7 Dealing with biased reporting of the available 
evidence (http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-7-dealing-with-biased-
reporting-of-the-available-evidence/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Chiu K, Grundy Q, Bero L (2017). 'Spin' in published biomedical 
literature: A methodological systematic review. PLoS Biology 
15(9):e2002173 
• Dwan K, Altman DG, Arnaiz JA, Bloom J, Chan AW, Cronin E, 
Decullier E, Easterbrook PJ, Von Elm E, Gamble C, Ghersi D, Ioannidis 
JP, Simes J, Williamson PR (2008). Systematic review of the empirical 
evidence of study publication bias and outcome reporting bias. PLoS One 
3(8):e3081 
• Dwan K, Altman DG, Clarke M, Gamble C, Higgins JP, Sterne JA, 
Williamson PR, Kirkham JJ (2014). Evidence for the selective reporting 
of analyses and discrepancies in clinical trials: a systematic review of 
cohort studies of clinical trials. PLoS Medicine 11(6):e1001666 
• Dwan K, Gamble C, Williamson PR, Kirkham JJ; Reporting Bias Group 
(2013). Systematic review of the empirical evidence of study publication 
bias and outcome reporting bias – an updated review. PLoS One 
8(7):e66844 
• Hopewell S, Clarke MJ, Stewart L, Tierney J (2007). Time to publication 
for results of clinical trials. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 
(2):MR000011 
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John Simes proposed international registration of all clinical trials after he 
showed that conclusions about treatments for ovarian cancer differed 
depending on whether the results of unpublished trials had been taken into 
account. 
Simes RJ (1986)  
Publication bias: the case for an international registry of clinical trials. Journal 
of Clinical Oncology 4:1529-41. 
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• Hopewell S. Loudon K, Clarke MJ, Oxman AD, Dickersin K (2009). 
Publication bias in clinical trials due to statistical significance or direction 
of trial results. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (1):MR000006 
• Jones CW, Keil LG, Holland WC, Caughey MC, Platts-Mills TF (2015). 
Comparison of registered and published outcomes in randomized 
controlled trials: a systematic review. BMC Medicine 13:282 
• Scherer RW, Meerpohl JJ, Pfeifer N, Schmucker C, Schwarzer G, von 
Elm E (2018). Full publication of results initially presented in abstracts. 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (11):MR000005 
• Song F, Parekh-Bhurke S, Hooper L, Loke YK, Ryder JJ, Sutton AJ, 
Hing CB, Harvey I (2009). Extent of publication bias in different 
categories of research cohorts: a meta-analysis of empirical studies. BMC 
Medical Research Methodology 9:79. 
• Song F, Parekh S, Hooper L, Loke YK, Ryder J, Sutton AJ, Hing C, 
Kwok CS, Pang C, Harvey I (2010). Dissemination and publication of 
research findings: an updated review of related biases. Health Technology 
Assessments 14(8):1-193 
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2.8 Avoiding biased selection from the available 
evidence   
Because single tests of treatments can be misleading, systematic reviews are 
used to identify, evaluate and summarize all the evidence relevant to addressing 
a specific question. 
 
Biases can distort individual tests of medical treatments and lead to erroneous 
conclusions. They can also distort reviews of evidence. Plans for systematic 
reviews should be set out in protocols, such as those published by Cochrane 
(formerly, The Cochrane Collaboration), making clear what measures will be 
taken to reduce biases. 
These include specifying clearly: 
• which questions about treatments will be addressed in the review; 
• the criteria that will make a study eligible for inclusion; 
• the strategies that will be used to search for potentially eligible studies; 
and 
• the steps that will be taken to minimise biases in selecting studies and 
data for use in the review. 
Different systematic reviews addressing what appears to be the same question 
about the effects of treatments quite often reach different conclusions. 
Sometimes this is because the questions addressed are subtly different. 
Sometimes it reflects differences in the materials and methods used by the 
reviewers.  In these circumstances it is important to judge which of the reviews 
are most likely to have been most successful in reducing biases. 
It is also worth considering whether the reviewers have other interests that 
might affect the conduct or interpretation of their review. For example, people 
associated with the manufacturers of evening primrose oil reviewed the drug’s 
effects on eczema. They reached a far more enthusiastic conclusion about the 
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value of the drug than a review done by investigators with no commercial 
interest, who included the results of unpublished studies in their assessment. 
It is not only commercial interests that can lead to biased selection from the 
available evidence for inclusion in reviews. We all have prejudices that can lead 
to biased selection of evidence, and we should not expect researchers, health 
professionals, patients and others assessing the effects of treatments to be 
immune. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 2.8 Avoiding biased selection from the available 
evidence (http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-8-avoiding-biased-
selection-from-the-available-evidence/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Thaler K, Kien C, Nussbaumer B, Van Noord MG, Griebler U, Klerings 
I, Gartlehner G; UNCOVER Project Consortium (2015). Inadequate use 
and regulation of interventions against publication bias decreases their 
effectiveness: a systematic review. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 
68(7):792-802. 
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2.9 Recognizing researcher bias, sponsor bias and 
fraud 
The commercial, academic or other vested interests of researchers and 
organizations tend to be reflected in the reports of treatment research in which 
they are involved. 
 
In 1764, a Dr R James published the 6th edition of his book ‘A dissertation on 
fevers and inflammatory distempers’. In it, he claimed that his secret ‘Fever 
Powder’ was successful in treating “smallpox, yellow fever, slow fever and 
rheumatism”. In support of his claims, he cited the testimonies of satisfied 
patients and a decline in the national mortality rate following the introduction of 
his miraculous ‘cure-all’. ‘Snake oil salesmen’ like Dr James have probably 
been a feature of medical practice for as long as patients have looked to doctors 
and others to help them deal with health problems. 
During the 19th century, the ground rules for testing treatment claims began to 
become clearer. Alternation began to be used to generate comparison groups 
and so ensure that ‘like would be compared with like’, and blinding became 
recognised as a way of reducing observer biases. For example, comparisons of 
homeopathic with orthodox medical treatments demonstrated not that 
homeopathy was effective, but that it was safer than the bleeding and purging 
being offered by mainstream doctors. 
By the early years of the 20th century, a pharmaceutical industry had begun to 
emerge which was profit-driven, and thus tempted to take liberties with claims 
for its products and the use of data to support these. In 1917, Torald Sollmann, 
an American pharmacologist, set out the principles to be observed in testing 
treatments. He noted that “Those who collaborate with [commercial firms] 
should realize frankly that under present conditions they are collaborating, not 
so much in determining scientific value, but rather in establishing commercial 
value”. Concerns about these sponsor and researcher biases – and sometimes  
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“Those who collaborate should realize frankly that under present conditions they 
are collaborating, not so much in determining the scientific value, but rather in 
establishing the commercial value of the article.” 
Sollmann T (1917)  
The crucial test of therapeutic evidence. JAMA 69:198-199. 
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outright fraud – grew throughout the 20th century, fuelled increasingly by 
evidence going beyond anecdotes. Sponsor and researcher biases make active 
use of other biases in pursuit of their vested interests. Recognising and reducing 
research biases and outright fraud remains a substantial challenge. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 2.9 Recognizing researcher/sponsor biases and fraud 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/2-9-recognizing-researchersponsor-
biases-and-fraud/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Lexchin J, Bero LA, Djulbegovic B, Clark O (2003). Pharmaceutical 
industry sponsorship and research outcome and quality: systematic 
review. BMJ 326:1167-70 
• Lundh A, Lexchin J, Mintzes B, Schroll JB, Bero L (2017). Industry 
sponsorship and research outcome. Cochrane Database of Systematic 
Reviews (2):MR000033 
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Section 3: Taking account of the play of chance 
When treatments are compared, any differences in outcome events may simply 
reflect the play of chance. Increasing the number of events studied in research 
reduces the likelihood of being misled by the play of chance. 
 
When two treatments are compared, any differences in outcome may simply be 
caused by the play of chance. For example, take a comparison in which 4 people 
improved with a new treatment and 6 people improved with an older treatment. 
It would clearly be wrong to conclude confidently that the new treatment was 
worse than the standard treatment: these results might simply reflect the play of 
chance. If the comparison was repeated, the numbers of patients who improved 
might be reversed (6 against 4), or come out the same (5 against 5), or in some 
other ratio. 
If, however, 40 people improved with the new treatment and 60 with the 
standard treatment, chance becomes a less likely explanation for the difference. 
And if 400 people improved with the new treatment and 600 with the older 
treatment, it would be clear that the new treatment was indeed very likely to be 
worse than the older treatment.  
The way to reduce the likelihood of being misled by the play of chance is thus 
to ensure that fair tests include sufficiently large numbers of people who 
experience the outcomes one hopes to influence. 
In some circumstances, very large numbers of people – thousands and 
sometimes tens of thousands – need to participate in fair tests to obtain reliable 
estimates of treatment effects. Large numbers of participants are necessary, for 
example, if the treatment outcomes of interest are rare – for example, heart 
attacks and strokes among apparently healthy middle-aged women using 
hormone replacement therapy (HRT). Large numbers are also needed if 
moderate but important effects of treatments are to be detected reliably – for 
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example, a reduction by 20 per cent in the risk of early death among people 
having heart attacks. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 3.0 Taking account of the play of chance 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/3-0-taking-account-of-the-play-of-
chance/)  
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3.1 Recording and interpreting numbers in testing 
treatments   
Numbers are needed to record the results of fair tests of treatments, and tables 
and graphs are used to describe the characteristics and experience of groups of 
patients, the treatment they have received, and quantitative estimates of 
treatment effects. 
 
Using quantification in testing treatments 
It was not until the early 18th century that numbers began to be used to assess 
the effects of medical treatments. Quantification began in the 1720s with 
comparisons of death rates following variolation (inoculation) against smallpox 
with the death rates associated with the disease itself. In 1732, Francis Clifton 
of London published a book entitled ‘The state of physick, ancient and modern, 
briefly considered: with a plan for the improvement of it’. He pointed out that, 
instead of trying to assess the worth of therapies by whether they accorded with 
theories, physicians needed to base their judgements about the treatment effects 
they had observed on sufficiently large numbers of their own patients. Tables 
and graphs were used increasingly to present the numbers and statistics derived 
from such observations.  
Replacing certainties with probabilities 
What were the motives for quantifying and tabulating observations? A book by 
George Fordyce published in 1793 provides an initial answer: Its title was ‘An 
attempt to improve the evidence of medicine’, and it was published in the 
Transactions of a Society for the Improvement of Medical and Chirurgical 
Knowledge. Quantification of experience was aimed at “increasing the certainty 
of medicine,” although he actually meant probability rather than certainty. 
Among the issues eagerly debated in 18th century British medicine was that of 
certainty versus the slowly growing notion of statistical probability. In 1772,  
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At the beginning of a century during which British use of quantified, tabulated 
data became widespread, Francis Clifton designed tables to record illnesses, 
treatments, and outcomes. 
Clifton F (1732)  
The state of physick, ancient and modern, briefly considered:  
with a plan for the improvement of it.  
London, printed by W Bowyer, for John Nourse without Temple-Bar. 
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James Lind summarized the transition from belief in an absolute authority to 
reliance on relative statistics, but even these remained partial in his view. More 
outspokenly, John Haygarth calculated probabilities of escaping infection with 
‘continuous fever’ or smallpox by counting the numbers of people who 
contracted the disease after contact with a patient. Using results “computed 
arithmetically by the doctrine of chances, according to the data”, Haygarth 
indicated that immediate isolation of patients with smallpox and fever in 
specific wards in Chester was required. 
Interpreting numbers 
How did people judge whether treatment comparisons were trustworthy? For 
example, during debates about bloodletting for treating fevers around 1800, 
statistics were widely used on both sides. Besides the issue of honesty, the 
question of bias was raised – of the need to compare like with like. A writer in 
the Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal in 1813 stressed that, if one could 
assume the data to have been honestly assembled and presented by both sides, 
the only way out of the maze would be through further “extensive comparative 
experiments”. 
During the 19th century there was gradual recognition that it is important to 
record the extent of uncertainty associated with estimates of treatment 
differences. Jules Gavarret, a mathematically-inclined Parisian physician, 
pointed out the need to analyse treatment comparisons of sufficient size and to 
calculate the ‘limits of oscillation’ (variation) associated with statistical 
estimates of treatment differences. However, this practice did not really become 
widely adopted until the second half of the 20th Century.  
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 3.1 Recording and interpreting numbers in testing 
treatments (http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/3-1-recording-and-
interpreting-numbers-in-testing-treatments/) 
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In 1840, the French physician and statistician Jules Gavarret published a book on 
statistical analysis of treatment tests, stressing the importance of estimating 
uncertainty and calculating ‘limits of oscillation’ associated with estimates of 
treatment effects. 
Gavarret LDJ (1840)  
Principes généraux de statistique médicale: ou développement des régles qui doivent présider 
à son emploi [General principles of medical statistics: or the development of rules that must 
govern their use]. Paris: Bechet jeune & Labé. 
  
 The James Lind Library’s Introduction to Fair Tests of Treatments 
 
 75 
 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Akl EA, Oxman AD, Herrin J, Vist GE, Terrenato I, Sperati F, Costiniuk 
C, Blank D, Schünemann H (2011). Using alternative statistical formats 
for presenting risks and risk reductions. Cochrane Database of Systematic 
Reviews(3):CD006776 
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3.2 Quantifying uncertainty in treatment 
comparisons  
Chance may affect the results of a study if too few outcomes have been 
observed to yield reliable estimates of treatment effects. Small studies in which 
few outcome events occur are usually not informative and the results are 
sometimes seriously misleading. 
 
To assess the role that chance may have played in the results of fair tests, 
researchers use ‘tests of statistical significance’. When statisticians and others 
refer to ‘significant differences’ between treatments, they are usually referring 
to statistical significance, and not necessarily to an ‘important difference’. 
Statistically significant differences between treatments are not necessarily of 
any practical importance. But, tests of statistical significance are still important 
because they help us to avoid mistaken conclusions that real differences in 
treatments exist when they don’t. It is also important to take account of a 
sufficiently large number of outcomes of treatment to avoid a far more common 
danger – concluding that there are no differences between treatments when in 
fact there are.  
In an earlier chapter, we mentioned Graham Balfour’s unbiased assembly of 
treatment comparison groups using alternation. He was also aware of the 
importance of taking account of the play of chance when interpreting the results 
of his test of claims that belladonna could prevent orphans under his care 
developing scarlet fever. Two out of 76 boys allocated to receive belladonna 
developed scarlet fever compared with two out of 75 boys who did not receive 
the drug. Balfour noted that “the numbers are too small to justify deductions as 
to the prophylactic power of belladonna”.  
We can reduce the likelihood that we will be misled by chance effects by 
estimating a range of treatment differences within which the real differences are 
likely to lie. These range estimates are known as confidence intervals. 
Repeating a treatment comparison is likely to yield varying estimates of the 
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differential effects of treatments on outcomes, particularly if the estimates are 
based on small numbers of outcomes. Confidence intervals take account of this 
variation, and so they are more informative than mere tests of statistical 
significance, and thus more helpful in reducing the likelihood that we will be 
misled by the play of chance. 
Statistical tests and confidence intervals – whether for analysis of individual 
studies or in ‘meta-analysis’ of several separate but similar studies – help us to 
take account of the play of chance and avoid concluding that treatment effects 
and differences exist when they don’t, and don’t exist when they do. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 3.2 Quantifying uncertainty in treatment comparisons 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/3-2-quantifying-uncertainty-in-
treatment-comparisons/) 
No methodology reviews were identified for this section. 
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3.3 Reducing the play of chance using systematic 
reviews and meta-analysis  
Combining data from similar studies (systematic reviews and meta-analysis) 
can help to provide reliable estimates of treatment effects. 
 
Systematic reviews of all the relevant, reliable evidence are needed for fair tests 
of medical treatments. To avoid misleading conclusions about the effects of 
treatments, people preparing systematic reviews must take steps to 
avoid biases of various kinds, for example, by taking account of all the relevant 
evidence, that is, by avoiding biased selection from the evidence available. 
Even though care may have been taken to minimize biases in reviews, 
misleading conclusions about the effects of treatments may also result from 
the play of chance. Discussing separate but similar studies one at a time in 
systematic reviews may also leave a confused impression because of the play of 
chance. If it is both possible and appropriate, this problem can be reduced by 
combining estimates derived from all the relevant studies using a statistical 
procedure now known as ‘meta-analysis’. 
An early medical example of meta-analysis was published in the British 
Medical Journal in 1904. Although methods for meta-analysis were developed 
by statisticians over the subsequent 70 years, it was not until the 1970s that they 
began to be applied more widely, initially by social scientists (one of whom 
coined the term meta-analysis), and then by medical researchers.   
Meta-analysis can be illustrated using the logo that marked the arrival of The 
Cochrane Collaboration in 1993. The logo illustrates a meta-analysis of data 
from seven fair tests. Each horizontal line represents the results of one test (the 
shorter the line, the more certain the result); and the diamond represents their 
combined results. The vertical line indicates the position around which the 
horizontal lines would cluster if the two treatments compared in the trials had  
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The Cochrane logo is derived from the forest plot of an early systematic review, 
which has been kept up-to-date since its first publication in 1992. 
Roberts D, Brown J, Medley N, Dalziel SR (2017)  
Antenatal corticosteroids for accelerating fetal lung maturation for women at risk of preterm 
birth.  Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2017. 
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similar effects; if a horizontal line crosses the vertical line, it means that that no 
‘statistically significant’ difference had been found between the treatments. 
 Taken together, however, the horizontal lines tend to fall on the beneficial (left) 
side of the ‘no difference’ line. The diamond at the bottom of the picture 
represents the combined results of these tests, generated using the statistical 
process of meta-analysis. The position of the diamond clearly to the left of the 
‘no difference’ line indicates that the treatment is beneficial. 
This diagram shows the results of a systematic review of fair tests of a short, 
inexpensive course of a steroid drug given to women expected to give birth 
prematurely. The first of these tests was reported in 1972. The diagram 
summarises the evidence that would have been revealed had the available tests 
been reviewed systematically a decade later, in 1981: it indicates strongly that 
steroids reduce the risk of babies dying from the complications of immaturity. 
By 1991, seven more trials had been reported, and the picture in the logo had 
become still stronger. 
No systematic review of these trials was published until 1989, so most 
obstetricians, midwives, and pregnant women did not realise that the treatment 
was so effective. Because no systematic reviews had been done, tens of 
thousands of premature babies suffered and many died unnecessarily because 
this effective drug was not used. This is just one of many examples of the 
human costs that can result from failure to assess the effects of treatments 
in systematic, up-to-date reviews of fair tests, using meta-analysis to reduce the 
likelihood that the play of chance will be misleading. 
By the end of the 20th century it had become widely accepted that meta-
analysis was an important element of fair tests of treatments, and that it helped 
to avoid incorrect conclusions that treatments had no effects when they were, in 
fact, either useful or harmful. 
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In more depth 
The James Lind Library 3.3 Reducing the play of chance using meta-analysis 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/3-3-reducing-the-play-of-chance-
using-meta-analysis/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Clarke M, Brice A, Chalmers I (2014). Accumulating research: a 
systematic account of how cumulative meta-analyses would have 
provided knowledge, improved health, reduced harm and saved 
resources. PLoS ONE 9(7):e102670 
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Section 4: Bringing it all together for the benefit of 
patients and the public 
Improving reports of research and preparing and updating systematic reviews of 
reliable studies are essential foundations of effective health care. 
 
Fair treatment comparisons avoid biases and reduce as far as possible the 
likelihood that users of research will be misled by the play of chance. These 
problems and their potential solutions have been discussed earlier in this book. 
However, even if the problems have been reduced as far as possible, health 
professionals, patients, policy makers and the public may often find it difficult 
to make direct use of reports of research. 
Often, this is because both the individual studies and systematic reviews of 
them are of poor quality. Too often reports fail to provide important details 
about the design, conduct and analysis of research studies; adequate 
descriptions of who participated in them; what was done to participants; and 
what effects treatments had on outcome measures of importance to patients and 
others. 
Very occasionally, a single well conducted and well reported study provides 
really strong evidence of the beneficial effects of an easily given treatment. For 
example, tens of thousands of people participated in a remarkable study that 
showed that an aspirin tablet could substantially reduce the risk of death among 
people who are experiencing heart attacks. Another example is a comparison of 
older with newer treatments to treat eclampsia - convulsions during pregnancy - 
which showed that the older treatment was more effective. However, only very 
rarely does a single study provide such strong evidence, so it’s important when 
reading reports of individual studies to ask what other evidence – published and 
unpublished – is relevant. This is why treatment and policy choices should, as 
far as possible, be informed by systematic reviews of as high a proportion as 
possible of the relevant evidence. 
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In more depth 
The James Lind Library 4.0 Bringing it all together for the benefit of patients 
and the public (http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/4-0-bringing-it-all-
together-for-the-benefit-of-patients/  
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4.1 Improving reports of research 
High quality, complete reports of research are needed to provide maximum 
return on the public’s substantial investment in research on the effects of 
treatments. 
The Medical Research Council’s randomised trial comparing bed rest alone 
with bed rest and streptomycin for treating pulmonary tuberculosis (mentioned 
earlier) is renowned for several reasons. As far as the research methods used are 
concerned, it introduced secure methods for assuring that the comparison 
groups would be similar. However, another feature of the study report is that it 
was exceptionally clearly written. This reflected the care taken by the three 
members of the research team. One of them, Marc Daniels, went on to publish 
papers commenting on the inadequacy of many reports of research, and 
recommending reporting standards. Some years later, Austin Bradford Hill, one 
of Daniels’ two senior colleagues, also offered guidance. 
It was not until the 1980s that formal surveys of the quality of reports of 
research began to reveal just how common deficiencies were. Remedies began 
to be suggested in proposed reporting standards. The 1990s witnessed concerted 
international initiatives to improve the quality of reports of research. In a BMJ 
editorial in 1994, Douglas Altman commented on “the scandal of poor medical 
research” – “we need less research, better research and research done for the 
right reasons”, he suggested. Since then, he and his colleagues in the Equator 
Network created a library of guidelines for reporting health research. Promoting 
adherence to these guidelines by researchers and journals remains a challenge. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 4.1 Improving reports of research 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/4-1-improving-reports-of-research/) 
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Austin Bradford-Hill and Marc Daniels 
Daniels M, Hill AB (1952)  
Chemotherapy of pulmonary tuberculosis in young adults: An analysis of the combined 
results of three medical research council trials. BMJ 1:1162-1168. 
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Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Jefferson T, Rudin M, Brodney Folse S, Davidoff F (2007). Editorial peer 
review for improving the quality of reports of biomedical studies. 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (2):MR000016 
• Turner L, Shamseer L, Altman DG, Weeks L, Peters J, Kober T, Dias S, 
Schulz KF, Plint AC, Moher D (2012). Consolidated standards of 
reporting trials (CONSORT) and the completeness of reporting of 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) published in medical journals. 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (11):MR000030 
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4.2 Preparing and maintaining systematic reviews 
of all the relevant evidence  
Unbiased, up-to-date systematic reviews of all the relevant, reliable evidence 
are needed to provide trustworthy evidence to inform choices in practice and 
policy. 
 
One of the twentieth century pioneers of fair tests of treatments, Austin 
Bradford Hill, noted that readers of reports of research want answers to four 
questions: ‘Why did you start?’, ‘What did you do?’, ‘What did you find?’, and 
‘What does it mean anyway?’ The quality of the answer to Hill’s last question is 
particularly important because this is the element of a research report which is 
most likely to influence actual choices and decisions about treatments. 
Only very rarely will a single fair test of a treatment yield sufficiently strong 
evidence to provide a confident answer to the question ‘What does it mean?’ A 
fair test of a treatment is usually one of several tests addressing the same 
question. For a reliable answer to the question ‘What does it mean?’, then, it is 
important to interpret the evidence from a fair test in the context of a careful 
assessment of all the evidence from fair tests that have addressed the question 
concerned. 
Lord Rayleigh - President of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science - expressed the need to observe this principle more than a century ago: 
“If, as is sometimes supposed, science consisted in nothing but the 
laborious accumulation of facts, it would soon come to a standstill, 
crushed, as it were, under its own weight…. Two processes are thus at 
work side by side, the reception of new material and the digestion and 
assimilation of the old…The work which deserves, but I am afraid 
does not always receive, the most credit is that in which discovery and 
explanation go hand in hand, in which not only are new facts 
presented, but their relation to old ones is pointed out.”  
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In his presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science, Lord Rayleigh, a British physicist, observed that “the work that deserves 
most credit is that in which not only are new facts presented, but their relation to 
old ones is pointed out”. 
Rayleigh, The Lord (1885) 
Address by the Rt. Hon. Lord Rayleigh. In: Report of the fifty-fourth meeting of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science; held at Montreal in August and September 
1884. London: John Murray: 3-23. 
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Very few reports of fair tests of treatments discuss their results in the context of 
a systematic assessment of all the other relevant evidence. As a result, it is 
usually difficult for readers to obtain a reliable answer to the question ‘What 
does it mean?’ from reports of new research. 
As noted earlier, embarking on new tests of treatments without first reviewing 
systematically what can be learnt from existing research is dangerous, wasteful 
and unethical. Reporting the results of new tests without interpreting new 
evidence in the light of systematic assessments of other relevant evidence is also 
dangerous because it results in delays in the identification of both useful and 
harmful treatments. For example, between the 1960s and the early 1990s, over 
50 fair tests of drugs to reduce heart rhythm abnormalities in people having 
heart attacks were done before it was realised that these drugs were killing 
people. Had each report assessed the results of new tests in the context of all the 
relevant evidence, the lethal effects of the drugs could have been identified a 
decade earlier, and many unnecessarily premature deaths could have been 
avoided. 
In an age in which research papers are increasingly made freely available online 
it should be possible to deal with the limitations found in most reports of new 
research. Rather than basing conclusions about the treatments on one or a few 
individual studies, users of research evidence are increasingly turning for 
reliable information to online, up-to-date, systematic reviews of all relevant, 
reliable evidence, because these are increasingly recognised as providing the 
best basis for conclusions about the effects of treatments. 
Just as it is important to take steps to avoid being misled by biases and the play 
of chance in planning, conducting, analysing and interpreting individual fair 
tests of treatments, similar steps must also be taken in planning, conducting, 
analysing and interpreting systematic reviews. This entails: 
• specifying the question to be addressed by the systematic review; 
• defining eligibility criteria for studies to be included; 
• identifying (all) potentially eligible studies; 
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• applying eligibility criteria in ways that limit bias; 
• assembling as high a proportion as possible of the relevant information 
from the studies; 
• analysing this information, if appropriate and possible, using meta-
analysis and a variety of analyses; and 
• preparing a structured report 
One manifestation of increasing recognition of the crucial importance of 
systematic reviews for assessing the effects of treatments has been the rapid 
evolution of methods to improve the reliability of reviews. The first edition of a 
book entitled Systematic Reviews [1995] was less than 100 pages long: only six 
years later, the second edition weighed in at nearly 500 pages and included 
rapidly evolving strategies for increasing the information obtained from 
research. 
There continue to be important developments in the methods used for preparing 
systematic reviews, including those needed to identify unanticipated effects of 
treatments and for incorporating the results of research describing and analysing 
the experiences of people giving and receiving treatments. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 4.2 Preparing and maintaining systematic reviews of all 
the relevant evidence (http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/4-2-preparing-
and-maintaining-systematic-reviews-of-all-the-relevant-evidence/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
• Baudard M, Yavchitz A, Ravaud P, Perrodeau E, Boutron I (2017). 
Impact of searching clinical trial registries in systematic reviews of 
pharmaceutical treatments: methodological systematic review and 
reanalysis of meta-analyses. BMJ 356:j448 
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• Hopewell S, McDonald S, Clarke MJ, Egger M (2017). Grey literature in 
meta-analyses of randomized trials of health care interventions. Cochrane 
Database of Systematic Reviews (2):MR000010 
• Martínez García L, Pardo-Hernandez H, Superchi C, Niño de Guzman E, 
Ballesteros M, Ibargoyen Roteta N, McFarlane E, Posso M, Roqué I 
Figuls M, Rotaeche Del Campo R, Sanabria AJ, Selva A, Solà I, Vernooij 
RWM, Alonso-Coello P (2017). Methodological systematic review 
identifies major limitations in prioritization processes for updating. 
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 86:11-24 
• Moher D, Tsertsvadze A, Tricco A, Eccles M, Grimshaw J, Sampson M, 
Barrowman N. When and how to update systematic reviews (2008). 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (1):MR000023 
• Page MJ, McKenzie JE, Kirkham J, Dwan K, Kramer S, Green S, Forbes 
A (2014). Bias due to selective inclusion and reporting of outcomes and 
analyses in systematic reviews of randomised trials of healthcare 
interventions. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (10):MR000035 
• Schmucker CM, Blümle A, Schell LK, Schwarzer G, Oeller P, Cabrera L, 
von Elm E, Briel M, Meerpohl JJ; OPEN consortium (2017). Systematic 
review finds that study data not published in full text articles have unclear 
impact on meta-analyses results in medical research. PLoS One 
12(4):e0176210 
• Tudur Smith C, Marcucci M, Nolan SJ, Iorio A, Sudell M, Riley R, 
Rovers MM, Williamson PR (2016). Individual participant data meta-
analyses compared with meta-analyses based on aggregate data. 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (9):MR000007  
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4.3 Using the results of research 
All research has been done in the past, but the results of research need to be 
used today and tomorrow to inform decisions in health care. Trustworthy 
evidence from research is necessary, but not sufficient, to improve the quality of 
health care. 
 
Over recent years, it has been realised increasingly that systematic reviews of 
research are needed to express fully the significance of fair tests of treatments. 
This trend has been reflected in a rapid increase in the numbers of reports of 
systematic reviews being published on paper and electronically. Sometimes 
reviews will show that no reliable evidence exists, and this is one of their most 
important functions. Similarly, reviews may sometimes confirm that reliable 
evidence is limited to a single study; and here, too, it is important to make this 
explicit. 
Systematic reviews of research are being used widely (a) to inform clinical 
practice, often through clinical practice guidelines; (b) to assess which medical 
treatments are cost-effective; (c) to shape the agenda for additional research; 
and (d) to meet the needs of patients for reliable information about the effects of 
treatments. 
These developments show that people trying to improve access to the evidence 
that is needed to inform choices in health care have accepted the importance of 
systematic reviews, but there is still a long way to go. Many thousands of 
systematic reviews will be needed to cover existing research evidence, and then 
kept up to date as new evidence emerges. Indeed, one journal editor suggested 
in 1993 that there should be a moratorium on all new research until we’ve 
caught up with what existing evidence can tell us. That didn’t happen and new 
research continues to appear at an overwhelming pace. 
Those responsible for disbursing funds for research must ensure that resources 
are provided to cope with this ever-increasing backlog.  Support for new studies  
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Andy Oxman and Elizabeth Paulsen recommend two sources of information that are derived 
from systematic reviews, presented in an open access format, and using language that is lay-
friendly: Cochrane Evidence and Informed Health.  
Oxman AD, Paulsen EJ (2019) 
Who can you trust? A review of free online sources of "trustworthy" information about 
treatment effects for patients and the public. BMC Med Inform Decis Mak. Feb 20;19(1):35. 
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should only be provided if systematic reviews of existing evidence have shown 
that additional studies are necessary, and that they have been designed to take 
account of the lessons from previous research. If journal editors are to serve 
their readers better, they must ensure that reports of new studies make clear 
what contribution new evidence has made to an up-to-date systematic review of 
all the relevant evidence. 
The increased availability of up-to-date, systematic reviews is improving the 
quality of information about the effects of treatments, but the conclusions of 
systematic reviews should not be accepted uncritically. Different reviews 
purportedly addressing the same question about treatments sometimes arrive at 
different conclusions. Their authors are human and we need to be aware that 
they may select, analyse and present evidence in ways that support their 
prejudices and interests. The continuing evolution of reliable methods for 
preparing and maintaining systematic reviews will help to address this problem, 
but they cannot be expected to abolish it. 
Systematic reviews are necessary but insufficient for informing decisions about 
treatments for individual patients and policies. Other important factors – values, 
preferences, needs, resources and priorities – must be considered. And this is 
the point at which the art as well as the science of health care needs to be 
deployed for the benefit of patients and the public. We hope that this book helps 
everyone to achieve this. 
In more depth 
The James Lind Library 4.3 Using the results of research 
(http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/essays/4-3-using-the-results-of-up-to-date-
systematic-reviews-of-research/) 
Systematic reviews of methodology: 
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• Akl EA, Oxman AD, Herrin J, Vist GE, Terrenato I, Sperati F, Costiniuk 
C, Blank D, Schünemann H. Framing of health information messages 
(2011). Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (12):CD006777 
• Chiu K, Grundy Q, Bero L (2017). 'Spin' in published biomedical 
literature: A methodological systematic review. PLoS Biology 
15(9):e2002173 
• Covey J (2007). A meta-analysis of the effects of presenting treatment 
benefits in different formats. Medical Decision Making 27(5):638-54 
• Moxey A, O'Connell D, McGettigan P, Henry D (2003). Describing 
treatment effects to patients. Journal of General Internal Medicine 
18(11):948-59 
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